India must concentrate on accelerated growth in agriculture, IT, services and exports during the next two decades, and make efforts fiscally to raise the rate of investment to start closing the gap with China.
IT was my 10th visit to China since 1978 when I landed in Beijing airport on June 25 from Kuala Lumpur. In 1978, I was the first Indian politician to set foot in China after the 1962 border conflict. I undertook that trip after I persuaded, in the teeth of Soviet-lobby objections, Prime Minister Morarji Desai to give up his traditional anti-Chinese knee-jerk approach and see the strategic value of befriending China. That strategic objective - how to prevent or minimise the prospects of China allying with Pakistan against India - is still as important today. In 1978, as External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee had not only opposed befriending China but had tried to prevent, tooth and nail, my visit to Beijing. By his ill-advised postures t oday as Prime Minister, from writing to United States President Bill Clinton about the "China threat" to allowing his Ministers to rake up the Tibet and Taiwan issues, Vajpayee is unwittingly "cementing" the Sino-Pakistan alliance. It was this two -faced "forked tongue" approach to China that had shattered the illusions of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962; it may, if circumstances develop, do the same to the Vajpayee government.
In October 1998, on my ninth visit, I was in Beijing when all our government-level contacts with China had broken down. After my arrival, perhaps at the urging of Vajpayee's media spokesperson in Delhi, at a routine daily press briefing of the Chinese Fo reign Ministry a correspondent popped the question: why was I being invited to China when I was persona non grata with the BJP-led coalition? The Chinese spokesman snubbed the correspondent with the remark, "Dr. Swamy is an old trusted friend, and he is welcome to China any time."
Such small-mindedness has characterised Sino-Indian relations from our side. No wonder then we have come to grief from time to time - and then, to make amends, have had to humiliate ourselves. For example, after the "China is a threat" fiasco, External A ffairs Minister Jaswant Singh petitioned the Chinese to permit him to visit China to make amends. After rebuffing him four times, the Chinese finally relented on condition that Jaswant Singh would "retract" (not explain away) the "China threat" statement of the Prime Minister. This Jaswant Singh did on all fours in Beijing. It was abject surrender. No wonder, then, the Vajpayee Government is unhappy with the warm reception I receive in China.
My latest visit to China was originally scheduled to enable me to do research on China's national income. This is a project for which Harvard University has once again appointed me to its faculty of economics (for the year 2000-2001) but this time withou t requiring me to be resident on its campus. However, my China visit acquired political significance when my hosts organised a meeting with the Secretary-General of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Fo r me, it was the first time ever. The Secretary-General, Li Yeng, also did me the honour of hosting a dinner in their resort-like Hotel Wen Shou on the outskirts of Beijing, where we had wide-ranging discussions on topics of mutual interest.
It is my intention to write on Sino-Indian relations in detail in these columns later, but for the present I propose to examine briefly the results of my research on China's national income and its distance from India's GDP. I shall also try to answer wh at is today the most-often asked question: Can India catch up with China?
THERE are three interesting questions often asked in discussions involving China-India comparisons. First, did the two countries start post-liberation economic planning in the 1950s from the same set of initial conditions? Second, is there a significant gap in economic levels now between the two countries? Third, is this gap bridgeable in the first two decades of the 21st century?
On whether China and India started their respective modern post-War economic planning from the same or similar levels of development, it needs to be recognised that many general similarities existed between the economies of India and China at the time In dia achieved its Independence in 1947 and the Communists assumed power in China in 1949. Until then, each had made only modest beginnings toward industrialisation. In the main, the modern factories in both countries were devoted to the production of ligh t consumer articles, particularly textiles. In each country a large percentage of the industrial production was from cottage and handicraft industries, and very little from heavy industry. The Japanese had developed heavy industry in China during their o ccupation of Manchuria, but this sector had not become integrated with the Chinese economy until later and after much of the equipment had been removed by the Russians during their occupation after the Second World War. China and India began their develo pment programmes in 1952, therefore, from a point at which neither country had made any great progress in heavy industry.
The relative position of China and India measured by ratio of outputs of commodities, prior to the launching of their economic development programmes, is reflected in Table 1. If we are to generalise on the basis of these ratios, we can say that at the d awn of planned economic development in 1952, China was clearly ahead of India in agriculture. But this was, however, not so in 1870, when China and India were on a par. Relative to India, China made much greater progress in agriculture during the period 1870-1952. The reasons for this are recorded in my book Economic Growth in China and India: A comparison in Perspective: 1870-1986 (UBS, New Delhi, 1989).
India, however, was ahead in industry and transportation. As a consequence, India's per capita income measured in PPP (purchasing power parity) dollars in 1952 was about 54 per cent higher than China's.
While there is at present no acceptable theory about which set of initial conditions is better for industrialisation in low per capita income countries, it is nevertheless clear that China in the early 1950s was better placed than India, to extract resou rces from agriculture to finance the planned industrialisation programme. Hence the heavy industry-oriented strategy made relatively more sense for Chinese planning than for Indian. Relative to China India thus was required to pay more attention to agric ulture (which it did not do until the food crisis of 1966-67).
In a nutshell, therefore, China was relatively in a much better position than India to embark on industrialisation in 1952 because its agriculture was not in shambles as India's was. Although India had a better infrastructural system than China, t he difference was not much. Hence, it was a monumental error on the part of India to have pushed for industrialisation in a command socialist model, without first having laid the foundation for agricultural progress. India had to learn this lesson, thoug h not very well, the hard way in the mid-1960s. We have still to correct that conceptual error since economic reforms in India post-1991, unlike in China, were not preceded by reforms in agriculture. Agriculture, instead of being converted into sh eet anchor for growth, became an albatross for the Indian economy. It has weighed down on growth except for sporadic bursts. China, on the other hand, sequenced its economic reforms by first creating an agricultural boom during 1980-85, and followed it u p with industrial expansion during 1986-96.
During the period 1952-80, although China outstripped India in terms of the physical output of 19 key industrial commodities, the two giant countries grew at about the same GDP (gross domestic product) rate because the sluggish growth of the Chinese agri culture and service sectors levelled its fast growing industrial sector. The Chinese and Indian per capita incomes in 1980 were thus approximately at the same level. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, in 1980 China initiated economic reforms ( a decade earlier than India) and as a consequence its economy grew at double the rate of growth of India during the 1980s and early 1990s. China thus considerably widened the gap with India during this period and that momentum has carried China forward i nto the 21st century.
Since 1993, there has, however, been a consistent slowdown in Chinese growth rates. Whereas in India since 1991 there was an acceleration, although during the three years before 2000 there has been a deceleration in growth rates in both countries. The av erage difference in growth per capita of China and India at the turn of the millennium is marginal and equal to the difference in population growth rates of the two countries. The headstart that China had in economic growth in the 1980s has, however, sto od it in good stead and thus China, in most aggregates and indices, is today considerably ahead of India. Table 2 shows that even as early as 1986, China had posted a considerable lead over India in outputs of most commodities.
How wide is the China-India gap today measured in four dimensions of economic progress: growth, globalisation, financial growth and human development?
Between 1986 and 1999 the GDP growth rate of China was maintained at a pace that made for a wide gap with India's. During 1996-98 China's average growth rate was 74 per cent higher than India's rate. (But in 1996-99, this gap narrowed considerably to jus t 8 per cent higher than India's). The per capita income, which was about the same in 1980 for both countries, had diverged in the two decades that followed. Evaluated in PPP terms, the gap was 86 per cent in favour of China, not only because of a higher growth rate of GDP but also because of a lower growth rate of population. In 1952, China's population was 57 per cent higher than India's. In the 1990s it was just 28 per cent higher. At present, China's population is growing at 1.0 per cent a year (tar get for 2000-2001: 0.92 per cent) while India's population is expanding at 1.9 per cent a year.
At this rate, India's population will overtake China's by 2025. China has an ambitious plan to reach zero population growth by 2020 to level at 1.5 billion people. If so, then India will overtake China by 2016, unless it implements some drastic plan to c urb population growth (at present there are no such plans whatsoever).
The higher growth rate of NDP in China was made possible by a much higher rate of gross domestic investment (as a ratio of GDP), of about 70 per cent more. The Chinese rate of growth of GDI during 1990-98 was 2.27 times the rate in India. One can therefo re conclude that the wide gap between India and China in per capita incomes (which gap was about zero in 1980), was partly due to a lower population growth, but primarily due to a much greater investment effort in China. India cannot close its per capita income gap by 2020, without a much faster GDP growth rate (for example, of 10 per cent a year), for which an even greater effort to raise the level of investment will have to be made. This is easier said than done. Since 1997, the GDI as a ratio of GDP in India has been falling, albeit erratically, owing to consumerism. Furthermore, the pressure to increase consumption will mount after the World Trade Organisation (WTO)-mandated quantitative restrictions are removed in April 2001, and tariffs are drast ically reduced. Hence a dynamic policy design for such an accelerated effort will have to be resolutely implemented in order to raise the level of savings (this has been discussed in my recent book India's Economic Performance and Reforms (Konark, New Delhi, July 2000).
However, judging by other indicators of productivity, China is not that far ahead. The proportion of irrigated land in agriculture is only 16 per cent higher in China. Gross cropped area under food crops was, however, 30 per cent lower, although y ield was 2.87 times higher. Agricultural value added per agricultural worker is just 17 per cent more in China. While commercial energy use per capita in kg of oil equivalent is almost double in China, the efficiency in its use measured by its ratio to G DP is surprisingly higher in India. This obtains despite China having 2.35 times more of scientists and engineers in R&D activities than India. It is clear that if productivity in agriculture is systematically raised in India, the food gap cannot only be closed, but India can surpass China. At the Chinese yield per hectare level, India can produce 579 million tonnes of foodgrain with today's technology.
In growth terms, then, the China-India gap can be closed if India designs its fiscal architecture in such a way that the rate of investment rises to above 30 per cent of GDP from the present 23 per cent, while it reduces the ICOR (incremental capital out put ratio) from 4.0 to 3.0, and at the same time maintains the structural balance levels for at least two decades (that is, fiscal stability manifested in five parameters: (a) an appropriate real interest rate; (b) a competitive and predictable real exch ange rate; (c) a low and stable inflation rate; (d) a sustainable fiscal policy; and (e) a viable current account level in balance of payments).
China has had an impressive growth in exports since 1980. At the present level of exports, at more than $200 billion, China's exports are 4.70 times that of India's. China is ahead in the export of services, which is expected to be a lead factor in the n ew millennium. At $24.52 billion Chinese export of services is 2.82 times the level of Indian exports of services. Import of services is almost equally large in China at 2.45 times that of India's.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy with Li Yang, Secretary-General of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. At right is Subbiah Shetty, president of the Karnataka unit of the Janata Party.
China's current account balance is a huge plus at nearly $30 billion, while in India it has been a minus throughout the last four decades. Right now it is $ -6 billion. No wonder then, China's international reserves are nearly $153 billion, nearly five t imes that of India's. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1997, when it was at a peak in India, was 13.21 times more in China but because of its massive export drive, despite a huge FDI inflow over two decades, China's present value of external deb t as a ratio of GNP is only 15.0 per cent, that is, less than India's at 18.0 per cent, despite a 55 per cent higher nominal external debt in China. China-based foreign enterprises accounted for nearly half the exports of China while in India it is not e ven 5 per cent. Not only that, more than 75 per cent of China's FDI went into the setting up of new enterprises, "green field" investments, while in India only 35 per cent was in such capacity-augmenting projects. Nearly 65 per cent of India's FDI went t o mergers and acquisitions of existing enterprises. What is even more ominous is that in 1999 Mauritius emerged as the largest foreign investor in India. This is a dubious source, and is likely to be recycled hawala funds from India.
In the field of information technology (IT) China has outstripped India in hardware although it lags behind in software. High technology exports as a percentage of manufacturing exports are almost double that of India's at 21 per cent. The per 1,000 pers ons availability of computers is 2.86 times in China. Even in the number of Internet hosts, despite China being a controlled society, the per 10,000 people ratio is slightly higher than in India. China has 10 times more mobile phones per capita than Indi a, almost three times more telephone main lines, and four times more televisions sets per capita.
China had 6.2 times more patent applications filed by foreigners than India. Chinese residents filed 7.1 times more such applications than Indians in their own country. India cannot therefore remain smug in the belief that it is ahead of China in softwar e because Indian computer engineers are already beginning to get outpriced by the huge salaries being paid to them by Fortune 500 companies in outsourcing. Thus some time in the future Chinese, Russian and Irish engineers can be lower-cost alternatives t o Indians. Fortune 500 companies would not hesitate to dump Indians then. Therefore, India has to move from being servers in software, to design and domain specialists in IT. I would also advocate a China-India-Israel consortium for this purpose, since t he three countries complement one another in this area, and its citizens dominate the academia in the U.S.
At present there is without doubt an unambiguous and large gap in the lead of China over India in overall globalisation. And surprisingly, therefore, an open democratic market economy - India - has to make special efforts to catch up with a controlled Co mmunist "social market" economy - China - and that too ironically in the area of globalisation. But India can close the gap with a new mindset at the political level, which however the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-led BJP is incapable of.
China has not only managed a high rate of investment, but has kept the prime lending rate (PLR) at a relatively low 8 per cent; the interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates was confined to 2.6 per cent. In India, the PLR is 12 per cent, whi le the interest rate spread is at 3.4 per cent. Clearly, China's configurations are more conducive to high domestic investment. Even though the Indian stock markets were established much before China's, in terms of market capitalisation, China is ahead a t $231.3 billion, which is 2.20 times that of India's. Chinese banks extend credit, measured as a ratio of GDP, at a rate of two-and-a-half times India's. Marginal tax rates on corporate incomes is at a maximum of 30 per cent, while in India it is 40 per cent. Even in fiscal decentralisation, the Chinese Central government transfers 51.4 per cent of the tax revenue to the provinces, while in India the figure is 36.1 per cent.
However, despite China being ahead of India in various financial factors, these gaps are not unbridgeable. A sincere and determined effort at financial restructuring by India can close the China-India gap in financial factors within a decade.
In 1999, according to the Human Development Report of the United Nations, China had a higher human development index (HDI) ranking than India. The index for China was 1.29 times that of India whose HDI was 0.563 in 1999, placing it 128th in the list of 1 42 countries. China was in the 98th place.
Life expectancy in years at birth was 1.15 times India's. The literacy ratio was 1.56 times and the infant mortality rate was less than half of India's. Public expenditure on health in China as a ratio of GDP was three times more. But public expenditure as a percentage of GDP was lower in China. Surprisingly, the Gini Index of Income inequality was also higher in China than India. But as analysed in my 1964 Harvard doctoral dissertation, such an unexpected result can obtain because the ratio of u rban per capita income to rural per capita income which was larger in China than in India, swamps the result even if intra-urban and intra-rural Gini Indexes were lower in China. Economic reforms in China had caused a sharp increase in urban incom es in the eastern sea board areas, and this caused the ratio to rise, since the rural western provinces lagged behind.
Here too, while overall China is certainly better off in the matter of quality of life factors than India, the gap can be bridged by a sustained effort to improve health and education.
In 2000, there is a substantial gap between China and India, but if India were to concentrate on a significantly accelerated growth in agriculture, IT, services and exports during the next two decades, the gap can be quickly bridged. Clearly, India will have to make strenuous efforts fiscally to raise the rate of investment to reach or cross 30 per cent, as a minimum condition to start closing the China-India gap. The task of course is within reach and it is a target for which the people would be willin g to make a sacrifice. "Catching up with China" is a worthwhile slogan for India's new millennium, along with a national commitment to grow at 10 per cent a year. Both goals are feasible and attainable, and within India's grasp. The question is whether t he polity is up to it, or will it sink further into the communal and fundamentalist morass that it is already knee deep in. There is no hope in the present dispensation.
Friday, December 10, 2010
PLA Navy Shipbuilding Notes From Pentagon Report
Some have suggested - based on the usual open source options that us armchair observers have access too - that Chinese shipbuilding of PLA Navy vessels has slowed down in 2010. Appearances can be deceiving though if you are not watching closely. First, it is important to remember we are in the final year of the Eleventh five year plan (2006-2010), and in the final year of these five year plans we typically do not find pictures of new classes of ships - rather we start seeing those pictures in the beginning of the five year plans.
For example, 052B and 052C destroyers were part of the Tenth five year plan (2001-2005) and they were basically built within that time frame, just like the 054s were laid down in the Tenth five year plan. However, it wasn't until the Eleventh five year plan (2006-2010) that we began to see the 054A air defense frigates.
While the new China report is dated 2010, we also need to keep in mind that it covers 2009, so it doesn't actually include the developments we are seeing this year. That means that next year, when we are reading the Pentagon's 2011 Chinese Military report we can expect it not to be discussing any new classes of ships - even if by next summer we are seeing photos of new classes of ships under construction in Chinese shipyards.
Surface Combatants
Lets look at a few examples, like this quote from page 3 of the report:
The PLA Navy continues its acquisition of domestically produced surface combatants. These include two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM); two LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM; and four (soon to be six) JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range HHQ-16 vertically launched naval SAM currently under development. These ships reflect the leadership’s priority on an advanced anti-air warfare capability for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a weakness of the fleet.By the end of 2009 China had launched six Jiangkai II class (Type 054A) guided missile frigates (FFGs), but as of pictures posted online this week China has actually launched 8 Type 054As, with a 9th at HuangPu shipyard in Guangzhou province looking like it could launch very soon (Looks like Feng already posted this). Given the tendency to build in numbers divisible by 5, that means a 10th Type 054A is likely to be launched by years end at Hudong Shipyard.
China appears to be producing a steady state of 2 Type 054As per year that will continue for the next 2 annual Pentagon reports. There may also be a new destroyer class under construction at JiangNan shipyard, but pictures are hard to come by lately. Given the significant upgrades to JiangNan shipyard during the Eleventh five year plan, it could be these ships are coming out at the end of the 5 year cycle delayed primarily due to the upgrades at the shipyard.
When examining the pictures of the Type 054As from HP and HD shipyards, one of the things that stands out to me is the new class of cutters for China's Maritime Safety Administration visible in some of the pictures, as well as several older cutters that appear to be getting electronic upgrades at the shipyards (another point Feng covered before I posted).
While not often a focus, the modernization and expansion of China's Maritime Safety Administration is a major aspect of the Eleventh five year plan that has largely gone unmentioned in the Pentagon's report. One would think after the incidents last year with the US Navy surveillance ships off the China coast that this would be something the Pentagon would mention in the report for Congress.
Missile Patrol Boats
One of the differences between the Pentagon's 2009 report and the Pentagon's 2010 report is the number of Houbei class fast missile boats. The 2009 report states "more than 40" while the 2010 report claims China has "deployed some 60" of the wave-piercing catamaran hull missile patrol boats. In the vacuum of annual Pentagon reports, China somehow managed to add 20 high speed missile patrol boats each with 4 anti-ship missiles a piece (80 new anti-ship missiles fielded to sea in a single years analysis).
Over the same period, the US Navy has exactly ZERO anti-ship missile programs fielding exactly ZERO modern anti-ship missiles on our naval ships. What exactly is the point of building large capacity naval warships in the US if we aren't developing or fielding the missiles necessary to fill the VLS cells? It is a factual statement to point out that the only extended range weapon system for surface combatants currently in development by the US Navy is the gun system to be mounted on the DDG-1000. Maybe the Zumwalt is intended to be the US Navy's Houbei killer - since neither the Arleigh Burke class nor the Littoral Combat Ships will have the weapons capable of performing that role.
Submarines
The Pentagon's 2010 report summarizes the PLA Navy submarine force as follows:
China continues production of its newest JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China may field up to five new SSBNs. One JINclass SSBN has entered service alongside two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSN), four older HAN-class SSNs, and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.The only difference worth noting is the DoD now counts an additional Yuan class submarine as operational. There have not been many new open source pictures of submarines this year, so it is unclear if there is a 5th Yuan running around somewhere.
China is further expanding its current force of nuclear-powered attack submarines and may add up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years.
China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class. The YUANclass SS are armed similarly to the SONGclass SS, but also include a possible air independent propulsion system. The SONG SS, YUAN SS, and SHANG SSN will be capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and testing.
Noteworthy is the Pentagon reports mention of the Type 095 SSN. That could mean that the Pentagon is aware of its construction. That would suggest the PLA Navy built only two Type 093s before starting construction of the Type 095s.
Aircraft Carriers
The Pentagon report statement:
China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class Hull-2, the ex-VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the release of China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), PRC-owned media reported high-level government and military official statements on China’s intent to build aircraft carriers. In April 2009 PRC Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated that “China will develop its fleet of aircraft carriers in a harmonious manner. We will prudently decide the policy [we will follow with regard to building aircraft carriers]. I am willing to listen to the views of experts from the navies of other countries and to seek opinions from our country.” While meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada in March 2009, PRC Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie stressed that China is the only big nation that does not have aircraft carriers and stated that “China cannot be without aircraft carriers forever.”Based on the pictures that continue to pop up all over the Chinese internet, it seems pretty clear to me that the Varyag will be able to get to sea by the end of next year. That will only be the beginning of the training and learning curve for China regarding aircraft carriers though.
China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia. Since 2006 China and Russia had been in negotiations for the sale of 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighters at a cost of up to $2.5 billion. These negotiations reportedly stalled after Russia refused a request from China for an initial delivery of two trial aircraft. Russian defense ministry sources confirmed that the refusal was due to findings that China had produced its own copycat version of the Su-27SK fighter jet.
The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. In May 2009, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that the Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in aircraft carrier operations.
Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domestically produced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China’s shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those projections. In March 2009, PLA Navy Admiral Wu Huayang stated that “China is capable of building aircraft carriers. We have such strength. Building aircraft carriers requires economic and technological strength. Given the level of development in our country, I think we have such strength.” The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020.
I strongly suspect, based on various writings and activities, that there is already some advanced construction for parts taking place for a domestically produced carrier. With that said, my guess would be we won't see evidence of shipyard construction of a domestically produced aircraft carrier for some time with funding for the first carrier provided by the Twelfth five year plan (2011-2015).
Measurements
The 2010 Pentagon report makes PLAN shipbuilding predictions based on analysis, for example, when discussing Type 095 SSNs the report says China "may add up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years." When discussing the Type 041 Yuan class the report states "China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class." When measuring China in 5 year plans, the next of which is set to begin next year, the report suggests China is about to build some 20 submarines while refraining from giving a time line. Between 2005-2010 China added 16 new submarines to their force - but 8 of those submarines were KILO-class imports, plus 4 Type 041s, 2 Type 094s, and 2 Types 093s. It is unclear what type, if any, submarines China is launching this year. There is speculation China will launch a 3rd Type 094 and a 5th Type 041 this year, meaning China's submarine production is currently averaging 2 per year.
The Pentagon's report may not be accurate with its projections of submarine construction, but I think the assessment is valuable for analysis even if it does turn out inaccurate. The question I have is whether anyone can predict what the 5 year plan for the PLA Navy will be for 2011-2015 based on the information available through open sources? There are 6 shipyards to work with - give it a shot in the comments.
Dalian Shipbuilding CorporationThis is the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (PDF) Pentagon report if you would like to compare the five years from 2005-2009 (remember, 2010 report is about 2009).
ex-Varyag upgrade
New Aircraft Carrier?
Surface Combatants?
Shanghai Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding Base
New Aircraft Carrier?
Surface Combatants?
Huangpu Shipbuilding Corporation
Surface Combatants?
Hudong Shipbuilding Company
Type 071s?
Surface Combatants?
Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. (formerly known as Huludao)
Nuclear submarines?
Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co.
Type 041s?
I think this is a useful exercise for any analyst, because when you give serious thought to the exercise you can then compare it to the US Navy 5-year shipbuilding plan. Naval power is a lot more than equipment though, and if you have seen the articles that interview sailors working in their new Type 054A frigates you will note how surprised they sound when discussing all their new technology.
Those articles suggest the PLA Navy still has a huge learning curve they can't buy off the shelf.
China: The South China Sea and Submarine Warfare
A Chinese submarine reportedly collided June 11 with a sonar array towed by the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56). Neither vessel was reportedly damaged in the incident, which took place in the South China Sea near Subic Bay in the Philippines. The collision was merely the latest in a series of naval incidents between China and the United States, and it may be considered a harbinger of increased naval — and particularly submarine — activity by numerous countries in the region.
Hình: the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56)
Analysis
A towed sonar array deployed by the U.S. guided missile destroyer John S. McCain (DDG-56) was struck June 11 by a Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) submarine, according to a CNN report citing an unnamed military official. The incident, in which only the array itself appears to have been damaged, took place in the South China Sea near Subic Bay in the Philippines, and Manila was quick to deny that it occurred within its territorial waters. The collision was only the latest in a series of recent naval incidents in the South China Sea between U.S. and PLAN vessels, and it certainly will not be the last.
The McCain, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is equipped with the AN/SQR-19 passive towed array sonar system. The linear array, only a few inches in diameter but nearly 800 feet long, can be towed a full mile behind the ship. Towed arrays are used to expand a ship or submarine’s acoustic sensitivity by not only complementing the bow-mounted sonar array but also by providing surveillance at a significant distance from the vessel itself — and the noise of its propellers.
Because the array emits no signal, it would be difficult for a submarine traveling underwater to detect it, although the long tether could get caught in the sub’s screw, something that submariners would be careful to avoid. Although warships do not keep the array deployed at all times, it would not be uncommon for them to do so for a variety of training or surveillance purposes, especially in the midst of an exercise. The McCain was reportedly one of four U.S. warships participating with vessels from six regional navies in the Philippine phase of the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise.
It is neither surprising that the McCain had deployed its towed array nor that the Chinese had a submarine on station to observe the exercises. The PLAN may already be adjusting protocols and guidelines for stalking U.S. destroyers based on this experience with a towed array, which the Chinese believed that American destroyers were no longer using, according to at least one report.
But the bottom line is not the specifics of this incident but that such incidents are increasingly likely to occur between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN as Chinese maritime interests begin to intersect with American maritime interests. Not only does it parallel a series of high-profile incidents back in March, but it also hearkens back to collision between a Chinese Jian-8 fighter and a U.S. EP-3E Aries II surveillance aircraft in April 2001.
The South China Sea has been and will continue to be a focal point for this competition. The bulk of the sea is considered international waters by the United States and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which Washington is a signatory but which has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate). At the same time, Beijing claims most of the South China Sea as Chinese waters, and there are disputes among numerous claimants around its periphery. It is also a heavily trafficked approach to the world’s busiest maritime choke point, the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 50,000 vessels transit each year.
Chinese claims overlap and conflict with almost every country native to the South China Sea: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Taiwan quietly and much less overtly claims all the same territory that China does. Just north of the South China Sea but still close enough to affect naval dynamics in the region, the Daiyoutai/Senkaku Islands are also an issue between China and Japan. At the same time, claims to disputed territory and seabed beyond the 200-nautical-mile-offshore Exclusive Economic Zone continue to be debated (and in some cases remain to be submitted) under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
What all this means is that expanding global interests, increasing resource extraction and international law are all causing long-standing issues in the South China Sea to take on a new urgency — and countries’ naval forces are being expanded accordingly.
The latest incident with the USS McCain is a reminder that this competition is also moving beneath the waves — and not just for the United States and China. For many of the smaller nations along the South China Sea fielding naval forces that are relatively ill trained and equipped, the risk of losing surface warships to more modern combatants and land-based maritime strike aircraft in a crisis is real. Although expensive, modern diesel-electric submarines, proficiently operated, are difficult to detect at slow speeds. With their ability to deploy mines, torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, such vessels offer an obtainable capability to project military force and hold maritime territory at risk while retaining an element of stealth. In addition, they offer the capability to clandestinely monitor activity in disputed territory.
Concerned in part with China’s overwhelming naval capability, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia are all seeking to acquire new submarines. (Taiwan is also in the market, but international pressure from Beijing has deterred any potential exporter for years.) Singapore has recently acquired two more modern submarines from Sweden. Of these South China Sea countries, only Indonesia, Taiwan and Singapore have any experience operating submarines (Malaysia and Vietnam do not).
Added to this mix are regular operations by U.S. Navy submarines, and although neither Japanese nor Australian subs are known to regularly transit the area, they probably pass through on occasion (as do, perhaps, even South Korean subs). This means that, in the coming years, depending on the particular nature of a crisis, nine countries in or near the region will have the capability to deploy submarines in response. In addition, there are some indications that Hainan Island in the South China Sea will become home to the PLAN’s newest ballistic missile submarines, the Jin (Type 094) class.
The deployment of submarines is, of course, only one half of the equation. Anti-submarine warfare is among the most challenging and subtle arts a naval force can master. The South China Sea is relatively shallow and is reportedly a poor environment for detecting submarines — a matter almost certain to be compounded by the noise produced by the steady flow of commercial shipping on the surface.
Most studies and histories of modern submarine warfare have focused on the Cold War competition in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea. The South China Sea is emerging as a new nexus for submarine and anti-submarine operations that presents a profoundly different environment — cramped, shallow and busy with commercial and military traffic. The challenge shifts from identifying a potential target as “ours” or “theirs” to sifting through acoustic libraries to identify a potential undersea target as belonging to one of eight or nine different nations.
The South China Sea will continue to see “incidents” at sea between U.S. and Chinese vessels, and it will become increasingly crowded as more and more countries along or near its periphery deploy submarines. Developments in submarine and anti-submarine warfare in the region certainly bear watching as events unfold.
CHINA SUBMARINE BASE – An Underwater Threat
As America and its allies focus their diplomatic energy on the Middle East and Afghanistan, China continues to alter the balance of power in East Asia with little fanfare and even less resistance. Consider recent revelations that China has built a massive new naval base in Sanya, on Hainan Island. The strategically located base, which features underground facilities, provides the Chinese Navy with hard-to-monitor deep-water access to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean region, as well as the ability to project military power in and
trade routes considered vital to all Asian countries. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has policed these sea routes. Washington and its allies have provided the security that has underwritten Asia’s remarkable growth in trade and prosperity. By building a Navy capable of taking on U.S. forces, however, it seems Beijing is now seeking to contest that U.S. maritime dominance—a move that could seriously undermine peace and prosperity throughout Asia.
The new base at Sanya will be able to handle numerous nuclear submarines, destroyers and, when China decides to build them, aircraft carriers. Already, China’s latest Jin–class nuclear ballistic-missile submarine has been spotted at the base, just a few hundred kilometers from China’s Southeast Asian neighbors, such as Vietnam. Complicating matters further, Beijing has driven massive tunnels into hillsides surrounding the base, which will let China shield its subs from detection by satellites and leave Washington practically blind when those subs do deploy.
To close observers of the Chinese military, the base’s construction is just the latest in a sustained Chinese effort to rapidly build up its military, particularly its Navy. Since 1995, when most countries were shrinking their defense budgets and downsizing their militaries in the aftermath of the cold war, China has commissioned more than 30 new submarines. It has acquired or is building at least five different classes of subs—a number unmatched by any other military. In addition to this ever-growing underwater force, Beijing has launched an impressive array of advanced destroyers, fielded more than 1,000 ballistic missiles since the early 1990s at a rate of 150 a year, and acquired hundreds of the most modern fighter aircraft. Many experts on the Chinese military tend to explain away this rapid buildup as necessary to deterring Taiwan’s independence. But China faces no serious challenge from Taiwan, and Taiwan’s military has done comparatively little to augment its firepower over the past decade. The fact is that for some time now, China has had more than enough military capacity to deter Taiwan from formally breaking with the mainland. Indeed, if anything, the worry today is that China can coerce Taiwan into a settling their dispute on Beijing’s terms. It also hasn’t escaped notice from others in the neighborhood that all these new military capabilities targeting Taiwan could also be used for alternative purposes.
Given that China faces a benign security environment with no real threats, its true military goals remain a mystery. Privately, however, U.S. officials are voicing concern. The Pentagon estimates that by 2010, China’s will be able to deploy five submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, making its nuclear force far more powerful and likely to survive an attack.
The Americans aren’t the only ones growing nervous. Last week, the Indian cabinet discussed China’s new base, and the Indian Navy chief expressed serious concern. He rightly suspects that a stronger Chinese nuclear Navy means that Beijing may plan on challenging Delhi’s longtime dominance of the Indian Ocean. Tokyo, for its part, is increasingly worried that its old rival is developing the ability—and the intention—to project power around Japan with impunity. Over the past few years, Japanese officials have reported dozens of Chinese maritime incursions into disputed waters close to Japan’s shores. And China will soon have the hardware to allow it to forcefully settle claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea—much to the consternation of the Philippines and Vietnam.
Nothing less than the future of East Asia now hangs in the balance. For many years, America’s security umbrella over the region has allowed Asia’s great powers, including China, to focus on economic growth rather than military competition. Now China’s rapid buildup could spark a costly regional competition that could potentially slow Asia’s economic growth, as funds are diverted to military spending and investors are scared away.
The last three U.S. administrations have based their China policies on hopes about what China might someday become. It is time to face the reality of what China has already created. This means devoting more military resources to the region and strengthening U.S. allies in order to reassure those them and send Beijing the message that the United States is committed to the regional status quo—which includes the maintenance of free markets and free governments across the Pacific. Beijing may not get it, yet. But such a U.S. response would be in everyone’s interests.
Nothing less than the future of East Asia now hangs in the balance. For many years, America’s security umbrella over the region has allowed Asia’s great powers, including China, to focus on economic growth rather than military competition. Now China’s rapid buildup could spark a costly regional competition that could potentially slow Asia’s economic growth, as funds are diverted to military spending and investors are scared away.
The last three U.S. administrations have based their China policies on hopes about what China might someday become. It is time to face the reality of what China has already created. This means devoting more military resources to the region and strengthening U.S. allies in order to reassure those them and send Beijing the message that the United States is committed to the regional status quo—which includes the maintenance of free markets and free governments across the Pacific. Beijing may not get it, yet. But such a U.S. response would be in everyone’s interests.
Talks of a PLAN Overseas Naval Base.
While the English report did not specify where the PLAN might setup a this base, the Chinese source mentioned Djibouti as a possible candidate as suggested by Rear Admiral Yin Zhou during a recent interview. (here) It is no coincidence that the Djibouti Minister of Foreign Affairs is visiting China today to "push forward friendly cooperation in various sectors and advance bilateral relations into a new level." (here)
Back on December 12, 2008, the PLAN first publicly acknowledged that they were "debating" a possible anti-pirate mission to the Gulf of Aden, (here) and their first flotilla was already gearing up for the tour. During that debate, Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University told China Daily that “sending naval vessels to the waters off Somalia may raise some concerns and provide ammunition to the ‘China threat’ demagogues." One year later, the Chinese anti-pirate mission to the Gulf of Aden has generally been well-received. How the world will react to an overseas PLAN naval base in Djibouti is largely dependent on what type of base it will be. Will it be a simple supply depot or one with full faculty, armed guards and C3I?
All your base are belong to me.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009; 3:02 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/30/AR2009123000134.html
BEIJING (Reuters) - A Chinese rear admiral has urged the nation to set up navy supply bases overseas in an interview posted on the Ministry of Defense website after China paid ransom to free a ship held for nine weeks by Somali pirates.
China has operated patrols for a year now in the narrow Gulf of Aden, escorting Chinese and foreign ships through waters menaced by pirates operating off the Somali coast.
But coal and ore shipping lanes off the east coast of Africa have proved harder to defend. The De Xin Hai, captured 700 nautical miles east of Somalia in October, was ransomed for $4 million on Sunday.
Reflecting on the hardships endured by the Chinese patrol ships in the anti-piracy effort, Rear Admiral Yin Zhou floated the idea of bases abroad to support the vessels. (http://news.mod.gov.cn)
"This is entirely a matter for the country's foreign policy circles, but I feel that would be appropriate if we could have a relatively stable, fixed base for supplies and maintenance," said Yin, who is director of an advisory committee for the Chinese navy's drive to upgrade information technology.
"I think countries near any relatively long-term supply bases established by China, and other countries participating in the escort mission, could understand," he said, adding that would be more affordable than re-supplying via ship on the high seas.
Asian neighbors have been monitoring China's international deployments for signs of the country's rising global status translating into a more assertive foreign policy and presence.
China has never renounced the use of force to bring self-ruled and democratic Taiwan, which it considers sovereign territory, under its rule, and increased Chinese military activity around a series of disputed atolls and rocks in the South China Sea has worried Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, which have their own territorial claims.
The Chinese navy did not call at any port during the four months of its first mission to the waters off Somalia, creating problems with straining supplies, medical care and homesickness for sailors unable to communicate with their families, the interview and other media reports have noted.
The anti-piracy mission off Somalia has been the first such long-distance projection of Chinese naval power since the Ming dynasty, 600 years ago.
Chinese ships communicated with ships operating under a multi-national anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, but did not formally cooperate with them. The deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces, Commodore Tim Lowe, suggested China could co-lead the grouping next year.
Yin did not suggest where the base would be. But the China Daily on Tuesday ran an interview with the Somali ambassador to China, asking for international assistance in building a coast guard.
Bypassing the NMD: China and the Cruise Missile Proliferation Problem
The PLA has had a long standing commitment to the development and deployment of modern cruise missiles. Recent reports that a Taiwanese businessman, acting on behalf of the PRC, was arrested in the US after trying to purchase a stealthy AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile from undercover Federal agents, should come as no surprise. China's deep involvement in the illegal acquisition of the Russian Kh-55 / AS-15 Kent is well documented. What is less well known is the 'collateral damage' to the global cruise missile non-proliferation effort produced as a result.
Last year Pakistan revealed the Hatf VII Babur Ground Launched Cruise Missile, which bears a remarkable resemblance to the Kh-55 and US BGM-109 Tomahawk. The Babur is the first 'indigenous' cruise missile deployed by an Islamic nation. This April, Malaysian analyst Prasun K Sengupta connected Iran and China's acquisition of Kh-55s from the Ukraine with Pakistan.
Moreover, a series of media reports in June last year centered on the issue of North Korea acquiring cruise missile technology from Russia via Iran. The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun, claiming ruling party and government agency sources, alleged that Iran had supplied the Kh-55 / AS-15 Kent to the DPRK [North Korea] for the purpose of reverse engineering. The Sankei Shimbun quoted a Defence Ministry source claiming 'They [Iran and DPRK] are linked by a network beneath the surface regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction.'
Russian Kh-55 Via The Ukraine The unfortunate proliferation of the Soviet era Kh-55 missile is a case study in how the post Soviet apparatus of state in former Soviet republics has been unable to contain leakages of sensitive technologies.
Rumours that China and Iran had acquired examples of the Kh-55SM missile from the Ukraine had been circulating for some years, but without any robust data to validate these claims. This all changed with the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and the collapse of the regime of pro-Russian president Leonid Kuchma, earlier accused of selling long range ESM systems to Saddam Hussein prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Hrihory Omelchenko, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on organised crime and corruption, sent an open letter this January to the new Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, in which he reported that government officials loyal to the former regime had actively obstructed investigations into the illegal export of the Kh-55SM missile to China and Iran.
The affair occupied considerable bandwidth in the Ukrainian and Russian media earlier this year. According to multiple sources, the illegal transaction was initiated in 2000, when two Russians, O.H. Orlov and E.V. Shelenko, both associated with the Progress export company, produced a false Rosvooruzheniye arms export agency contract document for the supply of twenty Kh-55SM missiles. This contract was provided to UkrSpetzExport, a Ukrainian equipment exporter. The two Russians were aided by the head of the Ukrainian Ukrazviazakaz company, Vladimir Evdokimov, a reservist in Ukrainian intelligence.
Omelchenko's letter claimed 'These cruise missiles were hidden on military depots of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry under the control of [the Defense Ministry] and under documentation signed by senior officials of the ministry, saying they were in fact designated as destroyed.'
A chain of front companies was used to cover the transaction, with six Kh-55SM missiles claimed to have been flown to China in April, 2000, and another six to Iran in June 2001. The deal included a KNO-120 ground support system for testing, initialising and programming the missiles. The destination of the remaining eight rounds was not disclosed. Iran is alleged to have paid US$49.5 million for the missiles, with Orlov and Shelenko earning US$600,000 for their efforts. Russian and Ukrainian media also allege that an Australian national, later identified by Sengupta as Haider Sarfraz, was part of the transaction. He is reported to have later died in a car accident.
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Iran's connections with the DPRK are also widely documented, and the export of DPRK ballistic missile technology to Iran provided a technological foundation for Iran's developing IRBM manufacturing infrastructure. Iran invested considerable effort in circumventing Western embargoes on exporting military technology, especially to maintain the large inventory of US aircraft and other equipment supplied during the reign of the Pahlavi regime.
A.Q. Khan Role? Further complexity has been added to this equation recently by analyst Prasun K Sengupta, editor of the Asian Defense Journal, who has connected the China-Iran Kh-55SM purchase with Pakistan, cite:
'While the world is now more than well conversant with the 'Wal-Mart' of nuclear weapons proliferation that was created by Pakistani metallurgist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan since the mid-1990s, it is only now that details are emerging about a parallel 'Wal-Mart' that Dr. Khan built up, this time for acquiring nuclear warhead-carrying land attack cruise missiles (LACM). The quest for acquiring such a capability began in late 1999, following which Dr. Khan began assembling a dedicated team of arms dealers and smugglers for the purpose of acquiring a few LACMs off-the-shelf from Ukraine, and then dividing the consignment among three beneficiaries: Pakistan, China and Iran.' ;
'Upon reaching Dubai, the consignment was transshipped to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, where the consignment was broken down into three parts: 12 Kh-55SMs for Iran, two Kh-55SMs for Pakistan and the remaining six for China. The latter two consignments were eventually airlifted to their final destinations by August 2001.';
'As the entire Kh-55SM smuggling operation was bankrolled by Iran, Teheran staked its claim for leading the R&D effort aimed at re-/reverse-engineering the Kh-55SM into a ground/sea-launched LACM with China and Pakistan playing secondary roles.' Sengupta also identifies a consortium of Chinese organisations formed to support the exploitation of acquired cruise missile technology, and the development of a GPS/RLG based midcourse guidance system and Scene Matching Area Correlator terminal navigation system, these including the Shanghai Institute for Optics and Fine Mechanics, China North Opto-Electro Industries Corporation (OEC), Changchun Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics, and Luoyang Opto-electro Technology Development Centre.
While it is impossible to independently validate Sengupta's claims, existing reports display wide discrepancies in the numbers of Kh-55SM rounds distributed between China and Iran, and adding Pakistan to the mix resolves this uncertainty. China's YJ-62 and Pakistan's Babur are sufficiently different in configuration from the Kh-55SM, that they cannot be regarded to be direct clones.
In the broader context, the significance of the Soviet era Kh-55SM should not be underestimated. This is the most capable strategic cruise missile in service globally, other than the US AGM-86B ALCM and BGM-109B Tomahawk. It is the backbone of the Russian air launched nuclear deterrent, equipping the Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-160 Blackjack A bombers.
The Design and Capabilities of the Kh-55 Kent
The Kh-55 family of cruise missiles owes its origins to a series of internal studies at the Raduga OKB during the early 1970s. Raduga were unsuccessful initially in convincing the Soviet leadership of the value of their concept, but this changed as public knowledge of the US AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile program became better known in the Soviet Union.
Russian sources claim that Raduga's early work on these weapons was opposed by many Russian experts who were deeply sceptical of the viability of such a complex new weapon.
The Kh-55 family of weapons most closely resemble the early US BGM-109 Tomahawk in concept, using a cylindrical fuselage with pop out planar wings, unfolding tail control surfaces, and a ventral turbofan engine, with guidance provided by a TERrain COntour Matching (TERCOM) aided inertial navigation system.
The most visible difference between the Tomahawk and Kh-55 families of missiles is the engine installation. The Tomahawk's Williams F107-WR100 engine is embedded in the tail and uses a ventral inlet duct and tailcone exhaust. The Kh-55's Omsk AMKB TVD-50 two spool turbofan is mounted in a nacelle which is stowed in the aft fuselage and deploys via a ventral door on a pylon after launch.
The TVD-50 is a critical piece of technology in the Kh-55 as it is a compact and fuel efficient turbofan in the thrust and size class required to power cruise missiles, standoff missiles and UAVs. The cited thrust rating is 400 to 500 kp (880 to 1,000 lbf), with a dry mass of 95 kg (210 lb), a Specific Fuel Consumption of 0.65, a length of 0.85 m (33.5 in) and diameter of 0.33 m (13 in).
The Tomahawk uses a four surface tail control assembly with anhedral on the stabilators, whereas the Kh-55 uses only three larger surfaces, with more pronounced anhedral, a configuration since adopted in the new Block IV RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. The largely symmetrical aft fuselage of the Tomahawk differs from the more pronounced sculpting of the Kh-55 aft fuselage.
The cylindrical fuselage configuration is essentially the same for both designs. The Tomahawk has a 21 in diameter, the Kh-55 a 20.5 in diameter, the Tomahawk weighed 2,700 lb at launch, the Kh-55 2,870 lb. The later blocks of the Tomahawk have a chinned 'Beluga' nose to reduce radar signature, the Kh-55 retains an ogival/spherical nose.
The baseline guidance package on both missiles is designed around a digital computer running Kalman filter and TERCOM software, with an onboard memory storing a digital map, coupled to a radar altimeter for terrain profiling and a low drift inertial unit. Tomahawks later acquired an optical Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator and GPS - the Soviet had DSMAC technology but it has never been disclosed whether this was added to the Kh-55 series. The cited designation for the Kh-55 guidance package is the Sprut and BSU-55.
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The air launched Kh-55 was followed by the improved 'Izdeliye 124' Kh-55OK, which was supplanted in production by the most capable 'Izdeliye 125' Kh-55SM / AS-15B subtype in 1987.
The aim of the Kh-55SM design was to further extend the striking range of the basic missile, cited at 1,350 NMI (2,500 km). This was achieved by adding a pair of conformal fuselage fuel tanks, which increased launch weight to 3,750 lb (1,700 kg), but increased cruise range to 1,620 NMI (3,000 km) with a 200 kT warhead fitted. The naval variant of the Kh-55SM was designated the RKV-500B.
A conventional derivative of the Kh-55, designated the Kh-555, was recently announced. A lightweight shorter ranging derivative weapon, the Kh-65, has been actively marketed since the 1990s.
For all intents and purposes, the late model Kh-55SM is a heavier and longer ranging equivalent to the BGM-109B Tomahawk, with performance closest to the AGM-86B ALCM.
The Proliferation Problem The Kh-55SM is an attractive target for reverse engineering, as the design is implemented using 1970s Soviet technology. As such, the electronics in the guidance system can be readily reversed engineered using commercial components, and the structure and engine use commodity materials technologies.
While many nations have the engineering capability to design an airframe in the class of the Kh-55 and Tomahawk, developing and integrating the guidance package and engine is much more demanding.
The low density electronics technology in the Kh-55SM is a case in point. Built using first generation Soviet embedded computers, the hardware is simple enough to copy directly and the software, coded in assembly language as was customary during that period, could be downloaded with no difficulty. Publicly available software tools such as reverse assemblers could be adapted with little effort to reconstitute the original source code for the missile navigation and guidance package, and ground support equipment. Unlike contemporary US weapons which use complex anti-tamper techniques in the software and integrated hardware, the Kh-55 predates this model by a generation.
Once the party performing the reverse engineering has reconstituted the original software, and cloned the original hardware, the reverse engineered Kh-55 can be launched on its own evolutionary path as a derivative design. This means additional navigation sensors to feed the Kalman filter, and a range of possible improvements to the missile's trajectory and navigation algorithms. In Third World economies with low labour costs, series production costs are not the issue they are in the developed world, and China's enormous growth is a compelling case study.
The only components in the design which could present difficulties for a new player are the engine turbine and combustors, which require some skill in metallurgical techniques to achieve viable durability in a four hour flight profile.
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The second reason is because the integration and testing of cruise missiles is very expensive, and remains so globally, due to the complexity of such weapons. While an indigenous design may have working components, the system may not function adequately as a whole. Reverse engineering the internals of the Kh-55, or parts thereof, makes for a viable shortcut to save significant time and money.
The third reason is the simple expedient of time to production. Any indigenous weapon will require many years of cyclic design evolution and flight testing to achieve credible reliability for operational use. Cloning a mature and proven foreign design avoids this pain.
To date indigenous Chinese cruise missiles have not matched the range performance of the Kh-55 series, this itself being a good incentive to reverse engineer the Russian design.
Iran's capacity to indigenously reverse engineer the Kh-55 is open to question. To date much of Iran's experience has been confined to component reverse engineering, rather than complete systems engineering. The Shahab 3 series are licenced DPRK designed No Dongs, similar to the Pakistani Ghauri II design. There is a large gap between reverse engineering individual components, or licence assembling proven designs, in comparison with tearing down a design and re-engineering it from the ground up.
The same could not be said for the DPRK, which has proven quite competent at evolving Russian IRBM designs, and designing and manufacturing often complex guidance and propulsion components.
The Sankei Shimbun claims by Japanese sources should thus be taken seriously. Given the well documented earlier collaboration between Iran and the DPRK on IRBM development and production, an analogous play using reverse engineered Kh-55s is entirely credible. Iran has oil derived funds and the DPRK has integration expertise. Neither of the these nations has good access to alternative sources.
Given the prospect of Iran acquiring advice, engineering support, and components from China, Pakistan and the DPRK, recent claims that Iran intends to produce a Kh-55SM clone should not be dismissed.
The Strategic Perspective Until recently Iran, the DPRK and China have relied primarily on ballistic missile technology to provide strategic striking power, with the former two yet to have the capability to produce compact nuclear warheads suitable for such applications.
The emerging US National Missile Defence system, and parallel effort to develop theatre missile defence capabilities, will blunt if not nullify any offensive advantage offered by ballistic weapons.
While ballistic weapons offer short flight times, they achieve this at the expense of easy detection at launch via boost phase heat emissions, and easy detection in midcourse and terminal flight, due to the radar signature of the warheads and ionisation trails during re-entry. As a result ballistic weapons provide little if any surprise effect in combat. As the US effort in BMD capabilities matures, smaller users of ballistic missiles will be confronted with the reality that most if not all of their missiles will be intercepted if launched, and any launches will be detected within seconds by early warning satellites, inviting immediate nuclear retaliation.
Cruise missiles present a viable means of bypassing the US NMD and TMD systems, once deployed. With very low heat and radar signatures, cruise missile launches are difficult to detect, and the weapons remain difficult to detect and track throughout their low flying cruise profiles. Unless an Airborne Early Warning & Control asset with suitable radar capabilities is on station, the missiles may elude detection until they hit their targets.
The idea of using cruise missiles to bypass the NMD program is hardly new. In 2002 Russian analyst Alexander Mozgovoi, writing for Rosvooruzheniye house journal Military Parade, argued this case persuasively: 'Low-visibility and low-flying cruise missiles can foil the U.S. efforts to develop the NMD'.
Another consideration is the cost of maintaining a warstock, and the capacity to deploy it covertly. Ballistic missiles are expensive in terms of exotic materials, propellants and component technologies designed to operate in a high vibration, rapid temperature change, high G environment. Cruise missiles can be built using 1970s aircraft technology. The size of IRBMs limits the number which can be carried to a single round on a TEL, and a large one at that. A single TEL can deploy four to six cruise missiles each of similar range and throw weight to the single IRBM carried by an equivalent TEL.
Cruise missiles are easily adapted for air launch, ship launch and submarine launch environments, the latter including torpedo tubes, vertical launch tubes, and slanted launch tubes. There can be little doubt that cruise missiles will become the weapon of choice for nations intent on challenging US global power.
Many questions still remain unresolved following the validation of initial Kh-55SM proliferation reports. The extent of China's role in facilitating cloning of the Kh-55SM, and the extent to which China's YJ-62 and Dong Hai-10 (DH-10) may be exploiting Kh-55SM technology is unclear. The extent to which the systems of the Kh-55SM may have been used in Pakistan's Babur is also unclear. The status of Iran's effort to clone the Kh-55SM, and the extent of DPRK involvement is unclear, as is the intended delivery platform – the IRIAF Su-24 Fencer being a prime candidate. The possibility that the DPRK is conducting its own indigenous effort to field a Kh-55SM clone also remains unresolved.
Robust answers to these questions may take considerable time, given the covert nature of development effort in all of the nations in question.
A key strategic issue for the US and its allies in Asia and the Middle East is now that the emergence of cloned or derivative production Kh-55SM cruise missiles is another 'when' question, rather than an 'if' question. The notion that the deployment of such weapons by China, Iran or even the DPRK should constitute a future strategic surprise event is no longer credible.
China's ongoing infatuation with acquiring foreign cruise missile technology, and its long running campaign to acquire Russian strategic bombers (refer http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.5/pub_detail.asp) presents a future strategic picture in which the PLA has strategic reach, armed with air launched cruise missiles, comparable to that of the Soviet Dal'naya Aviatsiya.
Cruise missile defence remains an underfunded aspect of current US force structure planning, and near term budgetary pressures have seriously compromised the two future US Air Force programs of most value in this critical role, the F-22A Raptor and planned X-band AESA equipped MC2A ISR aircraft. If the US is to have robust capabilities to defeat emerging Third World cruise missile forces, it will need to make an investment in many more F-22A squadrons, and deploy significant numbers of ISR platforms with X-band AESA radars suitable for cruise missile defence operations. Not to do so is to invite the otherwise inevitable consequences.
Dr. Carlo Kopp is a Melbourne, Australia, based defense analyst and academic. His work has been published by the US Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, and a wide range of publications including the Journal of Electronic Defense. He is a Research Fellow in Regional Military Strategy at the Monash Asia Institute, dealing with regional military strategy issues, editor and co-founder of the Air Power Australia website, and lectures on infowar, computing and systems engineering topics at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. His doctoral work, nearly a decade ago, involved the adaptation of AESA technology for long range networking.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Investigating the CBI
ARATI R JERATH, TNN, Aug 21, 2010, 01.23pm IST
We know it as the CBI or the Central Bureau of Investigation. But in court, the country's premier investigative agency cannot use the name. Thanks to a legal anomaly, the CBI in court goes by a nomenclature that dates back to colonial times, the Delhi Special Police Establishment. Thereby hangs a tale of subterfuge and ambivalence that explains, at least partially, why the CBI has failed to fill the shoes it's wearing.
Among the many controversies dogging the organisation that was envisaged as an Indian version of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI), a new debate has opened after Congress Member of Parliament Manish Tewari moved a private member's bill in the Lok Sabha last week, seeking statutory status for the CBI. Tewari's bill raises existential questions about the CBI. More importantly, it exposes the absence of an empowering legislation that would not only provide the CBI with an appropriate legal architecture for investigation and prosecution but also give it the autonomy it has been seeking to escape from direct government control.
Tewari, a lawyer by profession, states his case quite baldly. "In my view, the CBI is not a legal body. It draws its powers from a moth-eaten piece of legislation from the British Raj --the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE) (1946) whose legality is tenuous and whose six brief clauses carry the entire weight of the CBI's investigations into the many different kinds of crimes that afflict modern India, like economic espionage, cyber crimes and terrorism, " he says.
Tewari's shocker found an echo in the views of Biju Janata Dal Member of Parliament Pinaki Misra, also a lawyer by profession. Says Misra: "The CBI was created in an ad hoc fashion and every government has just carried on with it. It hasn't been tested in court so I'm not sure what would happen if someone were to challenge it legally. But it's certainly an imperfect way of functioning in this day and age and should be changed. "
First, here's a brief history of the CBI that sheds light on the debate that has raged within the government for more than 20 years without satisfactory resolution. The CBI began life as the Special Police Establishment in the Department of War in 1941 to investigate allegations of corruption in the department's expenditure. After World War II ended, in 1946, the British converted the SPE (War Department) into the Delhi Special Police Establishment and expanded its jurisdiction to cover corruption cases in other central government departments.
In 1963, the Government of India set up the CBI through a resolution and widened its net to include crimes other than corruption, such as narcotics smuggling, bank frauds, and so on. The DSPE was merged into the new organisation. But because the CBI was not created through an Act of Parliament, its legal powers rested in the DSPE Act of 1946. This is the reason why the CBI is forced to do all its legal work as the DSPE.
The government of the day in 1963 perhaps had its reasons for refraining from creating a statute specific to the CBI. The Indian state is a federal setup under which law and order is a state subject. The central government was clearly wary of doing anything that would seem to encroach on the powers of the states. At the same time, the need of the hour was an investigating agency that could deal with crimes that extended beyond the borders of one state into other states and were, therefore, too big for the local police to handle. The creation of the CBI through a resolution, rather than an Act of Parliament, was a subterfuge of sorts so as not to ruffle feathers and invite objections from the states.
The Centre's dilemma has been the CBI's weakness and has hampered its evolution as an independent specialised investigative agency. In the anxiety to preserve the autonomy of the states, the CBI has not been empowered to take suo moto cognisance of a crime. It can begin investigations only if a state government makes a formal request for CBI intervention.
Over the years, despite repeated appeals from the CBI, the organisation has remained under the thumb of the central government. "I keep pointing out that the CBI director needs government permission even to go the bathroom, " jokes former CBI director Joginder Singh.
Another retired CBI director who did not want to be identified points out: "Even a thanedar of the Tughlak Road police station (in New Delhi) has more powers than the CBI. He can register a case against the President of India if someone files a complaint. The CBI needs government permission to register a case and begin investigations, then it needs permission to prosecute, and then it needs government permission to appeal in a higher court if a lower court judgement goes against it. What kind of joke is this?"
Successive CBI directors have had serious issues about the powers and functioning of their organisation. Over the decades, they have pleaded for an empowering legislation but to no avail. "Nobody has listened. It makes me angry to talk about it, " says a retired officer.
Forget CBI officials, governments have ignored recommendations from two parliamentary standing committees and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. All stressed the need for a law to govern the CBI for optimum functioning as a premier investigation and prosecution agency. The country needs a strong CBI more than ever today because technological advances are changing the nature of white collar crime.
The retired CBI directors who spoke to TOI-Crest were quick to defend their former organisation. They insisted that it has functioned as well as it can, given its constraints. But they all acknowledged the need for a statute that lays down a clear, unambiguous legal framework for the CBI with guarantees for the much-talked about autonomy.
There are finer points of law in this debate that are best left for competent experts to argue. What Tewari's bill has done is to raise questions that many in the CBI have asked over the years as investigations hit political road bumps and pressures mounted on the agency. Says retired CBI director U S Misra: "Everything happens at the back door. Investigators should be answerable only to the magistrates but the way the system works, there is covert interference. "
Tewari's bill seeks to resolve some of the existing lacunae in the functioning of the CBI. It proposes autonomy for CBI investigations by empowering the body to take suo moto cognisance of certain crimes that extend beyond the jurisdiction of the police of one state. It also suggests parliamentary oversight for the CBI by making it accountable to a standing committee and not the ministry of personnel as is the current practice. And it proposes setting up an independent directorate of prosecution that would have the power to decide whether a prosecution is tenable, instead of leaving this critical decision in the hands of the government.
The minister of state for personnel Prithviraj Chavan counters Tewari with a vehement defence of the present system. He says that the government has studied the issue in depth and come to the conclusion that there is no need for a special law for the CBI. "There is no legal infirmity and the CBI is working well, " he says, stressing yet again that the federal set up should not be disturbed.
SAYS WHO?
It is ironic that the government hasn't cared to listen to the Parliament or its own commission on the contentious issue of creating a separate law for the CBI so that it functions in an effective, independent and more transparent manner. Here are some excerpts from three reports: "The Committee, in its earlier reports on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, had recommended that the possibility of getting enacted a separate Act for CBI in tune with the requirement of the time, rather than deriving its powers from the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, may be examined by the Government. The Committee regrets to note that no proactive steps have so far been taken in this regard inspite of strong recommendations made by this Committee. The Committee strongly opines that unless CBI is suitably empowered statutorily it cannot investigate cases and take it (sic) to logical conclusion. "
-The 24th report of the parliamentary standing committee on CBI's functioning, tabled in March 2008
"The Committee is of the opinion that since the various provisions of the Constitution mandate concurring powers to CBI, it is in public interest that, in this era of successive waves of terrorist attacks and highly technical crimes, a statute is enacted, without much ado, granting to the CBI, powers which are enshrined in the Constitution, so that such crimes are tackled in a more consistent and effective manner. "
-The 27th report of the committee, tabled in March 2010
"A new law should be enacted to govern the working of the CBI. This law should also stipulate its jurisdiction including the power to investigate the new category of crimes. "
-The fifth report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, submitted in June 2007
Among the many controversies dogging the organisation that was envisaged as an Indian version of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI), a new debate has opened after Congress Member of Parliament Manish Tewari moved a private member's bill in the Lok Sabha last week, seeking statutory status for the CBI. Tewari's bill raises existential questions about the CBI. More importantly, it exposes the absence of an empowering legislation that would not only provide the CBI with an appropriate legal architecture for investigation and prosecution but also give it the autonomy it has been seeking to escape from direct government control.
Tewari, a lawyer by profession, states his case quite baldly. "In my view, the CBI is not a legal body. It draws its powers from a moth-eaten piece of legislation from the British Raj --the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE) (1946) whose legality is tenuous and whose six brief clauses carry the entire weight of the CBI's investigations into the many different kinds of crimes that afflict modern India, like economic espionage, cyber crimes and terrorism, " he says.
Tewari's shocker found an echo in the views of Biju Janata Dal Member of Parliament Pinaki Misra, also a lawyer by profession. Says Misra: "The CBI was created in an ad hoc fashion and every government has just carried on with it. It hasn't been tested in court so I'm not sure what would happen if someone were to challenge it legally. But it's certainly an imperfect way of functioning in this day and age and should be changed. "
First, here's a brief history of the CBI that sheds light on the debate that has raged within the government for more than 20 years without satisfactory resolution. The CBI began life as the Special Police Establishment in the Department of War in 1941 to investigate allegations of corruption in the department's expenditure. After World War II ended, in 1946, the British converted the SPE (War Department) into the Delhi Special Police Establishment and expanded its jurisdiction to cover corruption cases in other central government departments.
In 1963, the Government of India set up the CBI through a resolution and widened its net to include crimes other than corruption, such as narcotics smuggling, bank frauds, and so on. The DSPE was merged into the new organisation. But because the CBI was not created through an Act of Parliament, its legal powers rested in the DSPE Act of 1946. This is the reason why the CBI is forced to do all its legal work as the DSPE.
The government of the day in 1963 perhaps had its reasons for refraining from creating a statute specific to the CBI. The Indian state is a federal setup under which law and order is a state subject. The central government was clearly wary of doing anything that would seem to encroach on the powers of the states. At the same time, the need of the hour was an investigating agency that could deal with crimes that extended beyond the borders of one state into other states and were, therefore, too big for the local police to handle. The creation of the CBI through a resolution, rather than an Act of Parliament, was a subterfuge of sorts so as not to ruffle feathers and invite objections from the states.
The Centre's dilemma has been the CBI's weakness and has hampered its evolution as an independent specialised investigative agency. In the anxiety to preserve the autonomy of the states, the CBI has not been empowered to take suo moto cognisance of a crime. It can begin investigations only if a state government makes a formal request for CBI intervention.
Over the years, despite repeated appeals from the CBI, the organisation has remained under the thumb of the central government. "I keep pointing out that the CBI director needs government permission even to go the bathroom, " jokes former CBI director Joginder Singh.
Another retired CBI director who did not want to be identified points out: "Even a thanedar of the Tughlak Road police station (in New Delhi) has more powers than the CBI. He can register a case against the President of India if someone files a complaint. The CBI needs government permission to register a case and begin investigations, then it needs permission to prosecute, and then it needs government permission to appeal in a higher court if a lower court judgement goes against it. What kind of joke is this?"
Successive CBI directors have had serious issues about the powers and functioning of their organisation. Over the decades, they have pleaded for an empowering legislation but to no avail. "Nobody has listened. It makes me angry to talk about it, " says a retired officer.
Forget CBI officials, governments have ignored recommendations from two parliamentary standing committees and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. All stressed the need for a law to govern the CBI for optimum functioning as a premier investigation and prosecution agency. The country needs a strong CBI more than ever today because technological advances are changing the nature of white collar crime.
The retired CBI directors who spoke to TOI-Crest were quick to defend their former organisation. They insisted that it has functioned as well as it can, given its constraints. But they all acknowledged the need for a statute that lays down a clear, unambiguous legal framework for the CBI with guarantees for the much-talked about autonomy.
There are finer points of law in this debate that are best left for competent experts to argue. What Tewari's bill has done is to raise questions that many in the CBI have asked over the years as investigations hit political road bumps and pressures mounted on the agency. Says retired CBI director U S Misra: "Everything happens at the back door. Investigators should be answerable only to the magistrates but the way the system works, there is covert interference. "
Tewari's bill seeks to resolve some of the existing lacunae in the functioning of the CBI. It proposes autonomy for CBI investigations by empowering the body to take suo moto cognisance of certain crimes that extend beyond the jurisdiction of the police of one state. It also suggests parliamentary oversight for the CBI by making it accountable to a standing committee and not the ministry of personnel as is the current practice. And it proposes setting up an independent directorate of prosecution that would have the power to decide whether a prosecution is tenable, instead of leaving this critical decision in the hands of the government.
The minister of state for personnel Prithviraj Chavan counters Tewari with a vehement defence of the present system. He says that the government has studied the issue in depth and come to the conclusion that there is no need for a special law for the CBI. "There is no legal infirmity and the CBI is working well, " he says, stressing yet again that the federal set up should not be disturbed.
SAYS WHO?
It is ironic that the government hasn't cared to listen to the Parliament or its own commission on the contentious issue of creating a separate law for the CBI so that it functions in an effective, independent and more transparent manner. Here are some excerpts from three reports: "The Committee, in its earlier reports on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, had recommended that the possibility of getting enacted a separate Act for CBI in tune with the requirement of the time, rather than deriving its powers from the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, may be examined by the Government. The Committee regrets to note that no proactive steps have so far been taken in this regard inspite of strong recommendations made by this Committee. The Committee strongly opines that unless CBI is suitably empowered statutorily it cannot investigate cases and take it (sic) to logical conclusion. "
-The 24th report of the parliamentary standing committee on CBI's functioning, tabled in March 2008
"The Committee is of the opinion that since the various provisions of the Constitution mandate concurring powers to CBI, it is in public interest that, in this era of successive waves of terrorist attacks and highly technical crimes, a statute is enacted, without much ado, granting to the CBI, powers which are enshrined in the Constitution, so that such crimes are tackled in a more consistent and effective manner. "
-The 27th report of the committee, tabled in March 2010
"A new law should be enacted to govern the working of the CBI. This law should also stipulate its jurisdiction including the power to investigate the new category of crimes. "
-The fifth report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, submitted in June 2007
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