A Chinese submarine reportedly collided June 11 with a sonar array towed by the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56). Neither vessel was reportedly damaged in the incident, which took place in the South China Sea near Subic Bay in the Philippines. The collision was merely the latest in a series of naval incidents between China and the United States, and it may be considered a harbinger of increased naval — and particularly submarine — activity by numerous countries in the region.
Hình: the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56)
Analysis
A towed sonar array deployed by the U.S. guided missile destroyer John S. McCain (DDG-56) was struck June 11 by a Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) submarine, according to a CNN report citing an unnamed military official. The incident, in which only the array itself appears to have been damaged, took place in the South China Sea near Subic Bay in the Philippines, and Manila was quick to deny that it occurred within its territorial waters. The collision was only the latest in a series of recent naval incidents in the South China Sea between U.S. and PLAN vessels, and it certainly will not be the last.
The McCain, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is equipped with the AN/SQR-19 passive towed array sonar system. The linear array, only a few inches in diameter but nearly 800 feet long, can be towed a full mile behind the ship. Towed arrays are used to expand a ship or submarine’s acoustic sensitivity by not only complementing the bow-mounted sonar array but also by providing surveillance at a significant distance from the vessel itself — and the noise of its propellers.
Because the array emits no signal, it would be difficult for a submarine traveling underwater to detect it, although the long tether could get caught in the sub’s screw, something that submariners would be careful to avoid. Although warships do not keep the array deployed at all times, it would not be uncommon for them to do so for a variety of training or surveillance purposes, especially in the midst of an exercise. The McCain was reportedly one of four U.S. warships participating with vessels from six regional navies in the Philippine phase of the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise.
It is neither surprising that the McCain had deployed its towed array nor that the Chinese had a submarine on station to observe the exercises. The PLAN may already be adjusting protocols and guidelines for stalking U.S. destroyers based on this experience with a towed array, which the Chinese believed that American destroyers were no longer using, according to at least one report.
But the bottom line is not the specifics of this incident but that such incidents are increasingly likely to occur between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN as Chinese maritime interests begin to intersect with American maritime interests. Not only does it parallel a series of high-profile incidents back in March, but it also hearkens back to collision between a Chinese Jian-8 fighter and a U.S. EP-3E Aries II surveillance aircraft in April 2001.
The South China Sea has been and will continue to be a focal point for this competition. The bulk of the sea is considered international waters by the United States and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which Washington is a signatory but which has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate). At the same time, Beijing claims most of the South China Sea as Chinese waters, and there are disputes among numerous claimants around its periphery. It is also a heavily trafficked approach to the world’s busiest maritime choke point, the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 50,000 vessels transit each year.
Chinese claims overlap and conflict with almost every country native to the South China Sea: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Taiwan quietly and much less overtly claims all the same territory that China does. Just north of the South China Sea but still close enough to affect naval dynamics in the region, the Daiyoutai/Senkaku Islands are also an issue between China and Japan. At the same time, claims to disputed territory and seabed beyond the 200-nautical-mile-offshore Exclusive Economic Zone continue to be debated (and in some cases remain to be submitted) under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
What all this means is that expanding global interests, increasing resource extraction and international law are all causing long-standing issues in the South China Sea to take on a new urgency — and countries’ naval forces are being expanded accordingly.
The latest incident with the USS McCain is a reminder that this competition is also moving beneath the waves — and not just for the United States and China. For many of the smaller nations along the South China Sea fielding naval forces that are relatively ill trained and equipped, the risk of losing surface warships to more modern combatants and land-based maritime strike aircraft in a crisis is real. Although expensive, modern diesel-electric submarines, proficiently operated, are difficult to detect at slow speeds. With their ability to deploy mines, torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, such vessels offer an obtainable capability to project military force and hold maritime territory at risk while retaining an element of stealth. In addition, they offer the capability to clandestinely monitor activity in disputed territory.
Concerned in part with China’s overwhelming naval capability, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia are all seeking to acquire new submarines. (Taiwan is also in the market, but international pressure from Beijing has deterred any potential exporter for years.) Singapore has recently acquired two more modern submarines from Sweden. Of these South China Sea countries, only Indonesia, Taiwan and Singapore have any experience operating submarines (Malaysia and Vietnam do not).
Added to this mix are regular operations by U.S. Navy submarines, and although neither Japanese nor Australian subs are known to regularly transit the area, they probably pass through on occasion (as do, perhaps, even South Korean subs). This means that, in the coming years, depending on the particular nature of a crisis, nine countries in or near the region will have the capability to deploy submarines in response. In addition, there are some indications that Hainan Island in the South China Sea will become home to the PLAN’s newest ballistic missile submarines, the Jin (Type 094) class.
The deployment of submarines is, of course, only one half of the equation. Anti-submarine warfare is among the most challenging and subtle arts a naval force can master. The South China Sea is relatively shallow and is reportedly a poor environment for detecting submarines — a matter almost certain to be compounded by the noise produced by the steady flow of commercial shipping on the surface.
Most studies and histories of modern submarine warfare have focused on the Cold War competition in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea. The South China Sea is emerging as a new nexus for submarine and anti-submarine operations that presents a profoundly different environment — cramped, shallow and busy with commercial and military traffic. The challenge shifts from identifying a potential target as “ours” or “theirs” to sifting through acoustic libraries to identify a potential undersea target as belonging to one of eight or nine different nations.
The South China Sea will continue to see “incidents” at sea between U.S. and Chinese vessels, and it will become increasingly crowded as more and more countries along or near its periphery deploy submarines. Developments in submarine and anti-submarine warfare in the region certainly bear watching as events unfold.
No comments:
Post a Comment