Mikoyan I-2000

Development of Russia's LFI (logkiy frontovoi istrebitel) lightweight tactical fighter has been dramatically accelerated after the Russian Air Force decided it's priorities for the next 10 years.

The I-2000 (Istrebitel [fighter] 2000), is due to become operational in 2005 as Russia's basic front-line fighter. It is also likely to become the leading export product of the Russian aircraft industry. Available information on the I-2000 indicates that it will be closely comparable to the US Joint Strike Fighter,operating in both air-to-air and air-to-surface roles.

The aircraft comes from a long line of Mikoyan lightweight fighters, such as the MiG-15 and MiG-21. It is about the same size as the MiG-21 (shorter by 1.3m but wider by 4.5m), but noticeable smaller than its immediate predecessor, the MiG-29. Take-off weight is estimated at around 12 tonnes; maximum take-off weight at about 16 tonnes.

The design requirements for I-2000 call for reduced radar and infrared visibility and very high manoeuvrability, as well as short take-off and landing. The aircraft will have a blended fuselage/centre wing and a thick wing centre-section, with curved leading and trailing edges. The unusual aerodynamic configuration and powerful thrust-vectoring engines should provide excellent agility. Take-off and landing runs are short thanks to a specially designed landing gear that permits approaches at high angles of attack.

According to official sources, single and twin-engined variants of the LFI are under consideration. The graphics show a twin- engined variant with an all-new power plant. No engines of the required thrust currently exist in Russia.

The first design of a very light new-generation fighter was prepared by Mikoyan in the early 1980s, when design work also began on the heavy fighter, the MFI (sometimes known as the 1-42). The result was 'Product 33' powered by a single RD-33 engine from the MiG-29. It was of conventional design, appearing similar to the US Lockheed Martin F-16.

Although work on Product 33 became well advanced, it was not ordered due to the air force's reorientation towards multi-role aircraft - the lightweight Product 33 could be used for close air combat only. The basic Product 33 design is being offered by Mikoyan to China as the FC-1 fighter.

The only competition within Russia for the I-2000 is the S-54, developed by Sukhoi from an advanced trainer design of the early 1990s.

The S-54 is essentially a smaller, single-engined Su-35, with a more conventional layout than the I-2000. The status of the S-54 is unknown, but is thought to be in the initial stages of development. Having no real Russian Air Force support, the S-54 is intended for export as a complement to the heavy Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft sold to China and India.

It has been decided that the heavy fifth-generation MFI will not enter serial production. It will, however, begin flight tests this August as a technology demonstrator. Mikhail Korzhuyev, recently appointed Mikoyan's general director, said that flights of the MFI are now a matter of honour for the company.

The aircraft has been ready for flight tests for about five years, but grounded for lack of cash. An extensive upgrade programme for the MiG-29 is to continue in parallel with development work on the I-2000.

IMPLICATIONS OF BECOMING SIGNATORY TO NPT

Signing the NPT would force India to forswear its nuclear option. Acceding to NPT means accepting the three basic principles represented by it -- non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right only to peacefully use nuclear technology. Can a country, placed as India is, sign the NPT? More so when the very foundations of the treaty are being shaken thoroughly?

In trying to comprehend the implications, it is very important for us to look at these three following questions:

1. What made India not sign the NPT in the first place?
2. Has anything changed between then and now?
3. Or whether these changes have highlighted the necessity of our accession to the treaty?

India’s objection is that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967. But the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. Secondly, while China is recognized as a nuclear ‘have’, India cannot remain a nuclear ‘have not’.

These two objections are still valid even after 40 years of the existence of the treaty. Having been an ‘unofficial’ nuclear power since 1974, India had to bear the brunt of sanctions imposed on it by the US government and had to live with the non-cooperation of the developed world for a better part of the last 40 years on science and technology front. This, in spite of our stated policy of ‘no first use’ of a nuclear weapon against any country and an impeccable non-proliferation record.

If at all there is anything that has changed in between, it is that some of the official ‘haves’ and others have indulged in proliferation. US connivance cannot be brushed aside in Israel’s nuclear program. Nor can Russia’s withIran and China’s withPakistan. Israel (a non-signatory country) has actively assisted South Africa in the 1970’s. The latter is believed to have tested a nuclear weapon in 1979. But it has subsequently destroyed its entire nuclear arsenal and joined the NPT in 1991.

Now Iran has publicly breached the treaty saying that it is only conducting its nuclear program with a view to produce nuclear energy. The suggestion becomes laughable in the light of the fact that Iran has one of the largest reserves of oil (third largest) and natural gas (fourth largest) in the world.Moreover, enriched uranium can only be used in light water reactors. Irandoesn’t possess light water reactor technology. North Korea has publicly withdrawn from the treaty in 2003 and gone ahead and tested nuclear weapons in 2006. The US and four others are trying their best to resolve the impasse with North Korea still.

None of these events necessitate or usher India into signing the NPT. So why should it sign? Having endured the sanctions regime, India had done commendably well in developing its own nuclear and space program strengths. Acceding to NPT is not a solution. Signing the nuclear deal with the US is. It will hasten the process of our development. It will make the world albeit grudgingly admit India into the club of nuclear ‘haves’. It still retains with it the benefits of a non-signatory country and is not obliged by the treaty conditions. Though being a non-signatory country, we have demonstrated a much better non-proliferation record than the ‘haves’ and other signatories.

Will signing the NPT now bring any extra benefit to India? I doubt it. We are fairly developed. Our progress on the nuclear and space fronts has made the world realize that India perhaps can be slowed down, but not stopped from developing its strengths.The deal with US will hasten the process and integrate us into the top tier countries. Singing NPT may bring these benefits with the added conditionality of forswearing the nuclear option. So, why should it oblige?